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MENTAL FITNESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE PRACTICE OF LAW
MICHAEL J. PLACE * and SusAN L. BLOOM**

INTRODUCTION

T he incidence

and control of mental health problems among pro-

fessionals poses special hazards for society and the profession itself.
Professional people have positions in which high levels of trust, confidence, and competence need to be maintained. Complicating this is
the fact that professionals traditionally have been self-regulating.
Thus, the professionals themselves must decide what standards are
needed and what ought to be done when such standards are not maintained by their colleagues. What to do with the mentally incapacitated
professional has been a seriously neglected and often confused aspect
of self-regulation.
Yet the need for safeguards in this area is increasingly urgent. A
recent New York Times headline read: "A.M.A. URGES AID TO
'SICK' DOCTORS." 1 The article was based on recommendations approved by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association to deal with doctors suffering from alcoholism, drug dependence,
or other forms of mental illness. In covering the same story, one news
magazine said: "For years, it has been an open secret that physicians
as a group run an unusually high risk of emotional disorders, alcoholism and narcotic addiction." 2 Aggravating the problem has been the
reluctance of doctors to expose such illnesses among their colleagues,
which results in a "conspiracy of silence."3 To break the conspiracy and
to deal with the problem, "the AMA adopted a plan to see that its
troubled or addicted physicians either seek help-or lose their
'4
licenses."
* Member, Illinois Bar. B.A., Northwestern University, 1970; J.D., State University
of New York at Buffalo Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, 1973.
"Member, New York Bar. B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1968; J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, 1973.

1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1972, at 27, col. 1.
2. NEwswEEK, Dec. 11, 1972, at 80, col. 1.

3. Id.
4. Id.
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Neither the conspiracy nor the problem is peculiar to the medical
profession. Such "occupational hazards" are similarly present among
lawyers. In 1969, the New York City Bar Association noted that "during the past decade the profession has become increasingly aware of
the problems presented by the attorney incapacitated by mental illness, drugs or intoxicants." 5 In the context of a fairly sophisticated
disciplinary structure, such problems present two "unique and perplexing" questions: (1) Can an attorney be suspended solely on the basis
of a "mental disability"; (2) Should the suspension of a mentally disabled attorney be for a fixed period, as in other disciplinary actions,
or for an indefinite period dependent upon the duration of the
mental illness?6
As if in response to these questions, a provision of the American
Bar Association's new Code of Professional Responsibility became effective on January 1, 1970. Ethical Consideration (EC) 1-6 of Canon
No. 1 states: "An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may
be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other than moral and
educational reasons, such as mental or emotional instability." 7 Then,
as if to combat the "conspiracy of silence," it continues: "Lawyers
should be diligent in taking steps to see that during a period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, if licensed, is not
permitted to practice."8 Thus, these provisions suggest that at least the
ABA thinks that an attorney can be suspended solely on the basis of
a mental disability and that the period of suspenion may be temporary or permanent, which probably means indefinite suspension as
contrasted to disbarment. It should be noted that these provisions
apply to applicants for admission to the bar as well as to practicing
attorneys.
As an "Ethical Consideration," these statements "are aspirational
in character and represent the objectives toward which every member
of the profession should strive."9 That is to say, they represent the
highest standards and principles of the profession. Each canon in the
new code also has "Disciplinary Rules." These, unlike the ethical considerations, "are mandatory in character" and "state the minimum level
5. Committee Reports, 24 RECORD

OF

N.Y.C.B.A. 31 (Supp. No. 7, Oct. 1969).

6. Id.
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-6 [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].

8. Id. (footnote omitted).
9. Id., Preliminary Statement.
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of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action."' 0 That is not to say, however, that a disciplinary
procedure against an attorney must be based upon a disciplinary rule.
11
"The fact is ... that there is no such clear-cut division in the Code."
Bar association enforcement agencies will rely most directly upon the
disciplinary rules, but, as was the case before the new code, more
generalized notions of proper conduct may be used. For example,
prejudicing the administration of justice'1 2 or engaging "in any other
13
conduct that adversely reflects on [one's] fitness to practice law"'

would be deemed improper. Though not the basis for mandatory
discipline, the ethical considerations are a vital part of the new code's
attempt to upgrade standards of professional conduct and responsibility.
The following pages will explore the interface of law and psychiatry in relation to the professional standards of mental fitness for
the practicing and prospective attorney. EC 1-6 suggests that an applicant or attorney may be unqualified because of mental or emotional
instability. This paper will attempt to discover when the applicant or
attorney should be unqualified because of mental or emotional instability. First, the long-standing requirement of good moral character
and fitness for the applicant will be examined in an attempt to discover what standard of mental health the applicant must meet in
order to be "fit" for admission to the bar. Then, the situation of the
practicing lawyer will be investigated in an attempt to determine to
what standard of mental health he will be held in order to continue
practicing. Throughout the examination of both areas, contrast will
be made between the medical or psychiatric diagnosis of the subject's
mental health and the legal understanding, weight, and effect of this
evaluation. In so doing, mental disease, disorder, illness and infirmity
are used interchangeably and are meant to refer to those classifications listed in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.
Finally, conclusions will be made and recommendations offered in each
area in an effort to bring bar association rules and procedures into
conformity with the present state of psychiatric knowledge.
10. Id.

11. Kaufman, The Lawyers' New Code, HAav. L.S. BULL. 19, 21 (Oct. 1970).
12. ABA CODE DR 1-102(5).
13. Id. (6).
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I.

THE APPLICANT

A. The Dilemma of Disclosure
For a long time, character and fitness have been regarded as integral considerations for admission to the bar. In New York, the statute
prescribes that the applicant should be admitted once the appellate
division of the supreme court 14 is "satisfied that such person possesses
the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law .

. . ."15

Both California 0 and Illinois"7 statutes require that

the applicant "be of good moral character," but both also inquire
into other qualifications which amount to "fitness."' 8 The fitness
component has traditionally included the emotional stability and responsibility of the applicant. Such an inquiry is viewed as being somewhere between intellectual competence in legal matters (as determined
by the bar exam) and moral fitness. The inquiry is justified on the
basis of the considerable pressures and strains presumed to be part of
an attorney's practice.' 9
Information pertinent to the character and fitness inquiry is
elicited from the applicant by a questionnaire normally sent out after
the bar exam. In it, various questions are asked for the purpose of
establishing a rather complete picture of the applicant's past. Some
states pose the question about the applicant's history of mental health
directly: "Have you ever been declared legally incompetent? Have you
ever received regular treatment for amnesia or any form of insanity
or emotional disturbance or mental disorder?" 20 Dropping the treatment aspect, Illinois asks: "Have you ever been adjudged incompetent
or insane by any court?" 2' More often, however, the question is not
posed directly. New York has no specific question about the applicant's mental health. In this situation, the matter of emotional stabil14. In New York, attorneys are admitted to practice by each department of the
supreme court rather than by the court of appeals, the highest court in the state. The

state is divided into four departments.
15.

N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968).

16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(c) (West 1971).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 701(a) (1968).
18. CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law in California, Rules II § 22, X § 101 (West 1973); In re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163
N.E.2d 429 (1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 82, rehearing denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
19. Interview with R. Newton Rooks, Chairman of the Committee on Character
and Fitness, Illinois Bar Association, in Chicago, III., Nov. 6, 1972.
20. Item 37, Fla. Bar Application, in Address of John Germany, 40 BAR EXAM.
29, 33 (1971).

21. Ill. Bar Application (1973).
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ity usually arises from the applicant's voluntary disclosure of unusual
overt incidents in his past or upon the committee's checking with the
schools he attended or the references he provided. Whether or not
there is a specific question, the applicant is faced with the problem of
deciding how to answer and of knowing exactly what is he required
to disclose. What constitutes "treatment"? Is it a librium prescription,
or psychoanalysis, or electroshock therapy? How long must it have
lasted in order to be "regular"? And if the question is not posed directly, the applicant's difficulty might be characterized as an "Eagleton
dilemma": What information about prior psychiatric care or treatment is he required to disclose because it might be relevant in evaluating his ability to perform a stated task? What relevance does it have
on his fitness to practice law?
The applicant's predicament is very real. Most character and fitness questionnaires have at least one catchall question asking if there
is anything else the committee ought to know about the applicant
which may bear on his fitness to practice law. Disciplinary Rule (DR)
1-101 (A) authorizes the disciplining of a lawyer "if he has made a
materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose
a material fact requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar. 2 2- Does an applicant violate DR 1-101 (A) if he
fails to disclose prior or present psychiatric care or treatment? Thus
far it appears that this question never has been raised, and perhaps it
never should.
Seeking information regarding the applicant's history of psychiatric care or treatment raises the possibility of his being denied admission on this ground. This not only discourages truthful disclosure,
but also discourages involvement with psychiatry. This makes the seeking of psychiatric treatment a negative component of the applicant's
past, when indeed recognizing a need for psychiatric care is a positive
sign of mental health and should be so regarded by the legal profession. Generally, it is the psychotic, the very sick person, who has no
grasp on the nature of his problem and his need for assistance. "Traditionally, neurotic patients, however severely handicapped by their
symptoms, are not classified as psychotic because they are aware that
their mental functioning is disturbed." 23 There is some indication that
22. ABA CODE DR 1-101 (A).
23.

AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC

OF MENTAL DISORDERS

AND STATISTICAL MANUAL

39 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-II].
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recognition of an emotional or mental problem is judged as significant
in measuring fitness because it indicates the individual's willingness
to cope with and control it.24
In addition to a history of psychiatric care, questions of mental
or emotional instability may be raised in other ways. The issue of
stability may be raised regarding an applicant whose acts have included public exposure, other kinds of public disturbances (e.g., shooting up a room with a gun),25 or whose condition is that of drug
addict, alcoholic, or homosexual. 26 While the first two examples suggest no immediate relationship to any form of mental disorder, the
latter three conditions do to the extent that each is classified in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.27 These are generally referred to as
"personality disorders" and are "characterized by deeply ingrained
maladaptive patterns of behavior that are perceptibly different in
quality from psychotic and neurotic symptoms." 28 Accordingly, these
types of difficulties are as a group much less likely to have caused the
need for psychiatric intervention. Thus, the disclosure considerations
for the applicant in this area are even more perplexing.
B. Evaluating Mental Fitness
Regardless of how these things come to the attention of the character and fitness committees, the crucial question apparently is: Is the
applicant a presently stable enough personality to handle responsibly
the legal interests of others?29 In other words, if there is a history which
raises a question about the mental state of the applicant, is there a
connection between, that history and the applicant's present capacity
to practice law? Can psychiatry help to answer this question? Is there
any other means of answering it?
The extent to which psychiatry will be helpful in this regard
should probably depend upon the severity of the mental disorder. If
previous psychiatric treatment was for one of the many forms of psychosis, for example, and if no improvement of the condition has been
24. Rooks Interview, supra note 19.

25. Id.
26. Interview with John Leach, Member of Committee on Character and Fitness,
8th Judicial District, New York State Bar Association, in Buffalo, N.Y., Dec. 12, 1972.
27. DSM-II 44-46.

28. Id. at 41.
29. Leach Interview, supra note 26.
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indicated, there probably should be little question that the individual could not function as an attorney. Psychosis is a
major mental disorder of organic or emotional origin in which the
individual's ability to think, respond emotionally, remember, communicate, interpret reality, and behave appropriately is sufficiently
impaired so as to interfere grossly with his capacity to meet the
ordinary demands of life.30
If an individual cannot remember, communicate, or interpret reality,
there is probably little disagreement that he could not function as an
attorney. It is likely that such an individual would also be a candidate
for civil commitment. A psychotic suffers from a serious form of
mental illness, and if medical opinion agreed on such a diagnosis, his
incapacity to practice would apparently be established.
At the other end of the diagnostic spectrum are the personality
disorders, presently including sexual deviance and drug dependence
(both alcoholic and narcotic). Their medical definitions, however,
are purely descriptive, and such a diagnosis does not necessarily relate
to the subject's contact with or ability to deal with reality, or the appropriateness of emotional responses, or the ability to think.3 1 Thus,
diagnosis of a personality disorder raises no inference regarding the
individual's capacity to function as an attorney. This is not to say that
his condition might not interfere with his life as an attorney. It is
only to suggest that at this point, in the absence of additional diagnoses, psychiatry as a body of knowledge cannot assist in making such
a determination. Certainly individual psychiatrists may be willing to
express opinions about a particular individual's capacity to function.
Contradictory psychiatric testimony regarding the same individual
would not be an unusual phenomenon. But such opinions must be
distinguished from scientific psychiatric principles. In the context of
this discussion-the evaluation of standards and the suggestion of
generalized approaches-the limitations in the current state of psychiatry must be recognized. Thus, on the basis of present psychiatric
descriptions of sexual deviance and drug dependence, no judgment can
be offered on whether these disorders would affect the applicant's
capacity to practice law.
30. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ed. 1969).
31. Id. at 31, 89-90.

ASSOCIATION,

A PSYCHIATRIC

GLOSSARY

80-81 (3d
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There are, of course, additional problems with a psychiatric evaluation of an applicant's fitness. The first is the rapidity with which an
individual's mental condition may change.32 Thus, the American
Psychiatric Association's classification system no longer speaks of neurotic or psychotic states, but rather of reactions. Recognition of this
principle could partially explain why pyschiatric opinion about the
same person can differ so dramatically, and why prediction of future
behavior is so difficult. That is to say, the fluctuation defies medical
precision.
A second problem with psychiatric evaluations of fitness is that
some forms of mental disorder as presently classified may actually increase the applicant's capacity to practice rather than detract from it.
For example, consider the diagnosis "compulsive personality," which
describes a person driven by needs for perfection and orderliness, closure and task completion, who cannot tolerate ambiguity, and who may
be unable to change his mind after he makes a decision. 33 The following is said about this diagnosis:
A moderate degree of compulsiveness often seems desirable by
Western standards and may be necessary for certain professional
achievement. Even one whose compulsiveness warrants the diagnosis
of personality disorder may successfully engage in occupations suited
34
to his temperament.
Thus, in the case of a personality disorder of this type, the behavior
pattern might very well promote rather than hinder the lawyer's professional competence. The point is that at this lower end of the mental disorder spectrum, the symptoms generally do not affect the individual's judgment or capacity to function. Diagnostically, therefore,
they are of little help in determining the applicant's potential ability
to function as an attorney. And yet the types of matters which most
often raise questions of stability are classifiable, if at all, in this range
of mental disorders.
With these limitations on the psychiatric evaluation of mental fitness to practice, other standards need to be evaluated. But what can
the applicant do to establish that he is sufficiently stable to practice
law? The practicing attorney is in a much better position to offer
32.

A.

FREEDMAN

& H.

KAPLAN, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

(1967).
33. Id. at 944; DSM-II 43.

34. A.

FREEDMAN

& H.

KAPLAN,

supra note 32, at 944 (emphasis added).
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persuasive evidence that he is stable enough to practice by showing
that he has been practicing during the period since his admission to
the satisfaction of clients, fellow attorneys, and judges. Some courts
have regarded this, as contrasted to psychiatric evaluation, as the
35
"best evidence" that an attorney is not incapacitated. Suspicious of

the imprecision of psychiatry, character and fitness committee members
also may weigh such functional evidence heavily.36 But what evidence
is there to weigh in the case of an applicant? He can offer successful
completion of law school, jobs he may have held, positions in organizations, and witnesses who can testify as to his general reliability; but
none of these can really establish his ability to cope with the stresses
of practice, when he is under the pressures of handling clients' interests
and satisfying their needs. Law school or part-time jobs may or may
not simulate the pressures of practice. Some students work hard, others
do not; some are serious, others are not. Some jobs are highly demanding, and others are not demanding at all. While certainly relevant, these matters do not offer highly persuasive evidence of the applicant's mental fitness to practice.
There is a further problem. Exactly what are the pressures and
strains against which the fitness committee is trying to measure the
applicant? Surely the pressures vary with the nature of the practice.
The trial attorney will periodically be under more stress than the
house counsel of a medium-sized business. Other facts should enter
in as well: for instance, the geographic location of the practice,
whether it is in a small or large community, whether he is a solo practitioner or in a large firm. Thus, not only are the variables great in deciding the relevance of evidence as to mental fitness, but they are also
great in defining the degree of stress and strain with which the applicant supposedly will have to contend.
What exists, therefore, is a situation in which neither medical
evidence in the form of psychiatric diagnosis nor functional evidence
of the individual's demonstrated capacity can be brought to bear on
the determination of emotional or mental instability. The obvious
conclusion is that there is something wrong with the standard. It is so
illusory that its application could only be arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore, subject to widespread abuse based on selective enforce35. E.g., In re Sherman, 66 Wash. 2d 718, 720, 404 P.2d 978, 979 (1965).
36. Rooks Interview, supra note 19.
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ment. In sum, the standard is administratively improper because, conceptually, no evidence can be developed which can sufficiently establish a basis on which a judgment can be made.
Medically, it is also incorrect. The first Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, in 1952, included a diagnosis called the "emotionally unstable
personality" which described an "individual who repeatedly exhibits
volatile affective and related behavior responses in the face of minor
stresses." 3 7 Perhaps this is exactly the notion in the minds of the
drafters of the new code-the person who simply could not control
himself under stress. The presumption, of course, is that such a person
would also be unable to effectively represent his clients. Whether such
a presumption is warranted is problematic and ought to depend upon
the nature of the responses to the stress, since they may or may not
prejudice the interests of the client.
In addition, the very nature of this diagnosis was nonmedical. In
medicine, diagnosis (descriptive labelling) is made for the purposes of
categorizing like symptoms in order to predict and treat, with an end
toward cure. In the setting of the legal or administrative agency, the
classification or label is used as the basis for determining the rights
and duties of a person as he functions in society. It has been said about
the label "emotionally unstable personality" that "psychiatric diagnosis may be made as an aid to disposition if the patient is a member
of an institutional community, such as the military or a school." 381 This
statement seems to be a recognition of the fact that such a medical
diagnosis is made not to serve a medical function, but to serve an administrative one. Perhaps because the diagnosis was not serving any
valid medical function, it has been dropped in the second edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. If it is no longer accepted
medically, the question must be raised regarding the validity of its
use as a legal or administrative standard.
To conclude that an applicant for admission to the bar should not
be unqualified because of mental or emotional instability does not end
the inquiry. Though the standard is improper, the idea of discovering an incapacitating mental disorder in an applicant may continue to
be valid. The problem, then, is in formulating an administratively
and medically sound standard and a process which will both protect
37. A. FREEDMAN & H.
38. Id. at 947.

KAPLAN,

supra note 32, at 946-47.

ATTORNEYS' FITNESS

the public and give the applicant a chance to prove that he is fit to
practice law. Since EC 1-6 does not differentiate between applicants
and attorneys, however, it will be useful to examine the situation of
the attorney before reaching any conclusions about the applicant's
position.
II. THE ATrORNEY
A. Nature of the Problem
The relationship between mental health problems and the practicing attorney is quite different from that of the applicant. Having
been admitted to the bar, the attorney is accorded the privileges and
status of a professional. This confers upon him a great degree of latitude and discretion in dealing with the matters confronting him in
both legal and personal life.
Does a lawyer have a duty to disclose the fact that he is undergoing psychiatric care? Or that he voluntarily committed himself to a
mental hospital? When these questions were posed to a member of
the New York State Bar Association's Professional Ethics Committee,
the answer was "no" to both. 9 Though this opinion does not necessarily reflect the accepted attitude, at the very least it indicates the
different nature of the problem for the attorney as opposed to the applicant. Under most circumstances, then, the issue of the attorney's
mental health is more likely to be raised only after the commission
of some overt act which appears to be noticeably abnormal to either
clients or fellow attorneys.
Attorneys have long been subject to disciplinary sanctions for engaging in certain kinds of prohibited conduct. The California statute
formulates the standard in traditional terms: "The commission of any
act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption... constitutes
a cause for disbarment or suspension." 40 Phrased in this Nway, the
statute has strong penal overtones. Other statutes mitigate this to a
certain extent, and at the same time expand the scope of the undesirable conduct, by mandating disbarment or suspension for, "any
39. Interview with Ralph Halpern, Chairman of the Professional Ethics Committee, New York State Bar Association, in Buffalo, N.Y., Dec. 5, 1972.
40. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106 (West 1962).
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conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" 41 or for any

acts which tend "to bring the courts and the legal profession into disrepute."42 Such highly generalized wording certainly could be construed to encompass acts which result from mental illness, and perhaps
even the status of being mentally ill. However, research reveals no reported disciplinary action against an attorney based solely upon alleged mental illness. Thus, in order to discover how lawyers will treat
mental problems in other lawyers, it will be necessary to examine the
cases in which mental disability is raised as a defense to a disciplinary
proceeding based upon certain professional misconduct of the attorney.
B. The Defense of Mental Incapacity
1. General Approaches. States have not treated the defense of

mental disability uniformly. New York is among the states which take
the position that mental illness is not a defense to a disciplinary ac-

tion for professional misconduct. The leading case in the area is In re
Samuels, in which it is stated:
Reprehensible conduct on the part of an attorney may not be justi-

fied on the ground that he lacked the physical or mental ability to
cope with the ethical requirements of his profession. It is well settled
that physical or mental deterioration
is not a defense to disciplinary
action for professional misconduct. 43
The rationale for this position is that the proceeding isnot punitive
in nature. A person unable to act in accordance with his professional
duty will therefore receive the same treatment as the person unwilling to do so. Thus, irresponsibility coupled with or caused by mental
illness merits disbarment or suspension. 44 Other courts in New York
have held to this position even to the extent of disbarring an attorney
in the face of strong, but contradictory, evidence that he was suffering
from mental disease (neurotic reaction type with disassociated phenomena and amnesic episodes) at the time of his acts which rendered
him incapable of practicing law. 45

41. N.Y. JUDIciARY LAw § 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
42. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 751(a) (1968).
43. In re Samuels, 22 App. Div. 2d 564, 567, 257 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (1st Dcp't
1965).
44. Id. at 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
45. Dallal v. Darrigrand, 31 App. Div. 2d 442, 298 N.Y.S.2d 533 (4th Dep't
1969).
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At the other extreme is the state of Washington which held in
In re Sherman4 that mental irresponsibility at the time of the acts
is a complete defense in a disciplinary action. In that case, after prolonged litigation, the attorney, with a long history of mental problems
(including one diagnosis of schizophrenia), was able to establish his
mental irresponsibility at the time of making false statements on his
application to the bar and sending insulting and contemptuous letters
to judges and attorneys in another state. 47 He was then able to carry
the burden of showing that he was presently capable of practicing,
despite his past illness. Thus, even though he was still suffering from
mental illness, but not to an incapacitating degree, the court imposed
no form of discipline conditioned upon his voluntarily receiving further psychiatric treatment. 48 The issue of recurrence of the illness became relevant only when the probability of recurrence was "great."
Significantly, the 1960 Sherman decision is the only one cited in EG 1-6.
From this, at least some idea can be gleaned as to how the drafters
intended EC 1-6 to be interpreted.
Illinois adopts a position similar to Washington's. In In re Bourgeois,4 9 the court said that suspension, not disbarment, was the proper
way to deal with an attorney whose professional misconduct was
caused by mental illness. The suspended attorney would then have
the burden of showing that he has overcome the problem, that it is
not likely to recur, and that he has been rehabilitated and is once
again fit to practice law. 0 Thus, the Illinois standard differs from the
Washington one (1) by indicating that at least some period of suspension will be ordered; and (2) by imposing a much more difficult
standard regarding the likelihood of recurrence. The Illinois court may
well have adopted the standard from the initial Sherman litigation.
But it was subsequently rejected by the Washington Supreme Court
as being "an almost impossible standard from a psychiatric standpoint."' l Since the rejection of the standard in Washington came after
the writing of the Illinois opinion, it is possible to infer that the
court would act somewhat differently today. Nevertheless, the Illinois
position is a variation on the Sherman approach.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

58 Wash. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 888 (1960), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
66 Wash. 2d 718, 404 P.2d 978 (1965) (reappeal).
Id. at 725, 404 P.2d at 982.
25 Ill. 2d 47, 182 N.E.2d 651 (1962).
Id. at 51, 182 N.E.2d at 654.
66 Wash. 2d at 724, 404 P.2d at 981.
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There are some indications that the suspension alternative is
being employed even in a jurisdiction such as New York. In In re
McDonald,52 the physical and mental condition of the respondent attorney was "taken into account" because "at some time in the future
respondent might be able to overcome his infirmity and to rehabilitate
himself." 53 Therefore, a period of suspension was imposed, assumedly
rather than disbarment. A similar result was reached in a recent case
54
in another department of that state.
Thus, even in the general approaches to and applications of the
defense of mental illness in disciplinary proceedings, the tenor is uncertain. The confusion is not limited to the general formuhations, but
also extends to using psychiatric evidence in particular cases. This can
be further illustrated by examining several cases in detail which emphasize the use of the psychiatric evidence.
2. Case Studies. In In re Moody55 the professional misconduct
involved misusing and misappropriating money which the attorney
held in trust, commonly referred to as commingling of funds. The
misconduct was not disputed, but the respondent attorney offered
proof to show that it was caused by "manic-depressive psychosis" and
alcoholism for which he was undergoing psychiatric treatment. Thus,
he argued that suspension, not disbarment, was the appropriate action. The same court which decided Sherman one year earlier rejected his argument and affirmed the disbarment, much to the dismay
of the dissenters. The dissent argued that the defense of mental
illness established in Sherman should be available in all disciplinary
proceedings and should not depend upon the nature or quality of the
specific acts involved. The majority did not rebut this argument.
Tested in terms of what is presently known about individuals
suffering from a manic-depressive psychosis, the decision illustrates a
rather surprising lack of psychiatric sophistication. As has been discussed earlier, psychosis represents the most serious form of nonorganic mental disorder.5 6 Specifically, characteristics of the manic-depressive include loss of contact with reality, hallucinations, delusions
of wealth, confusions about time and place, and inability to identify
52. 28 App. Div. 2d 1141, 284 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1967).

53. Id. at 1142, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
54. Custer v. State Bar Ass'n, 39 App. Div. 2d 437, 336 N.Y.S.2d 211 (4th Dep't
1972).
55. 69 Wash. 2d 808, 420 P.2d 374 (1966).
56. See text accompanying note 26 supra.

592

ATTORNEYS' FITNESS

people and things. 57 Assuming that Moody suffered from some or all
of these textbook symptoms, it is easy to see how his illness could have
caused his misconduct. His delusions of wealth may have caused him
to think the funds were his own. Or he simply may not have been able
to identify the funds as belonging to particular clients. Despite the severity of the mental disorder involved in this case and the clear-cut
connection between the disorder and the misconduct, the court disbarred the attorney. Perhaps more explicable in a state like New York
which does not recognize the defense at all, the result remains unreasonable in light of the psychiatric knowledge of this particular
diagnosis. There seems to be no legal or policy reason to justify ignoring psychiatric evidence of this kind since suspension would protect
the public as well as disbarment would. Furthermore, the result must
raise serious doubts as to the continuing validity of the Sherman
decision.
In Grove v. State Bar58 the attorney, who had once before been
reprimanded by the state bar association, was charged with ten counts
of professional misconduct, including failure to file and defend suits
for clients, retaining fees for services not performed, and purposeful
evasion of communication with clients. These acts, according to the
California court, involved moral turpitude and justified disbarment.
The respondent attorney offered a psychiatric report which stated his
need for intensive psychiatric treatment for a diagnosis of "compulsive
neurosis." Such persons are characterized by extreme immaturity, impulsiveness, impairment of capacity to form sound judgments and
lack of ability to continue a project to a timely conclusion. Though
this individual's mental disorder was not as severe as Moody's, the
relationships between the symptoms and the misconduct are again obvious, especially in regard to such matters as task completion. But
again, the court rejected his plea for suspension and ordered disbarment saying: "[o]ur primary concern must be the fulfillment of
proper professional standards, whatever the unfortunate cause, emotional or otherwise, for the attorney's failure to do so." 59
In re Wheelock6 ° and In re Ricketts. 61 In the Wheelock case, the

attorney was charged with deception in misrepresenting what he had
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

A. FREEDMAN& H. KAPLAN, supra note 32, at 683.
66 Cal. 2d 680, 427 P.2d at 164, 58 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1967).
Id. at 685, 427 P.2d at 167, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
249 Ore. 572, 439 P.2d 872 (1968).
Id. at 575, 439 P.2d at 873.
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actually done for a client. The attorney's conduct was similar to a
prior instance where he said that he had taken trips for the client's
interests and sold property for a certain price neither of which he
actually had done. In the Ricketts case, the attorney was faced with a
pesty client who insisted upon making a claim which was without
merit. The attorney said he filed the suit, when indeed he had not,
and forged a judge's signature on a phony order purporting to dismiss
the suit. In both cases, the court was convinced that the conduct involved indicated a psychiatric, rather than a disciplinary, problem:
i.e., "mental depression" or "mental problem." Thus, rather than suspend, the proper action in each case was to place the attorney on
probation for a period of two years with a proviso for summary suspension should substantial evidence show a recurrence of the problem.
The definitions of "mental depression" and "mental problem"
are not stated. They are certainly not medically sound psychiatric
diagnoses; nor are they found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.
Likewise, there is no attempt to connect this "psychiatric" problem
to the misconduct involved. Whether probation may or may not be a
fair sanction under the circumstances, it certainly should not be justified by pseudo-psychiatric jargon and medical causality.
C. Manipulation and Confusion
Several conclusions are suggested by examination of these cases
in light of the stated approaches of the various jurisdictions. First is
that the psychiatric evaluation of the attorney's condition is entirely
secondary, if relevant at all, in the court's determination of the matter.
This is true whether the misconduct seems severe or mild. The true
motivation for the decisions may be a desire to punish because of the
severity of the misconduct (Moody), or a prior history of failure to
meet professional obligations (Grove), or a feeling that what was done
was not really so awful as to warrant disciplinary action at all
(Wheelock and Ricketts). This suggests that psychiatric opinion will
be manipulated to justify a desired result: sanctioned to rationalize
mild disciplinary action and ignored when stronger action is desired.
Thus, even under the seemingly sophisticated approach of Washington state, the result is a situation in which psychiatric evidence is
employed to avoid responsibility for conduct which does not involve
"fault" and to ignore it when the conduct does involve "fault," with

ATTORNEYS' FITNESS

the concept of "fault" being inferred from the perceived severity of
the misconduct. Ironically, this is exactly the opposite approach which
the law takes generally to problems of the mentally ill. It is wellknown that as the act of the individual becomes morally blameworthy,
the greater the impact of a defense of mental illness. Thus, in treating
the most seriously blameworthy acts, those classified as crimes, insanity
is a complete defense, entirely exonerating him from responsibility for
his actions. In tort, on the other hand, the law generally holds the
mentally ill person liable for his acts, whether negligent or intentional.62 Why this general approach has been totally reversed by lawyers in dealing with other lawyers is unknown.
One could attempt to justify it by arguing that the disciplinary
proceeding is sui generis, neither civil nor criminal, 63 and therefore
different standards must be used. But this certainly does not stand up
under analysis. Even the wording of many statutes, including notions of
moral turpitude, bring wrongfulness in as an element, thereby making
it very much like a criminal proceeding. And to say that disbarment is
not punishment for wrongdoing is like saying that incarceration is not
punishment for juveniles-a concept soundly rejected. 64 Accordingly,
there does not seem to be anything in the nature of the disciplinary
proceeding to justify this reversal in treatment afforded the mentally
ill person. The reason must be extralegal and might well be found
in the lawyer's extreme discomfort with and distrust of psychiatry as
a tool in the judicial process.
One means by which this distrust can be expressed is by diluting
the effect of psychiatric evidence. Thus, the "best evidence" of fitness
to practice law is viewed by courts as being the fact that the attorney
has been practicing and representing clients capably and competently.6 5
Even in the face of psychiatric opinion to the contrary, the court will
rely upon evidence of his ability to function as an attorney. This may
not, by itself, seem unreasonable. But it is more difficult to explain
when compared to the weight given psychiatric evaluation in other
areas of the law, such as competency to stand trial.
The test for competency to stand trial is whether the accused "has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
62.
63.
64.
65.

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 135 (4th ed. 1971).

In re Sherman, 58 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 363 P.2d 390, 391 (1961).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
66 Wash. 2d at 720, 404 P.2d at 979.
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degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.""0 Generally stated, the test is whether the accused can assist in making his
own defense. One might think that the attorney would be in the best
position to help in making such a determination. After all, he is the
one who knows the elements of the crime and a proper defense; he
must interview and consult with the accused repeatedly. But in evaluating competency to stand trial, the accused's ability to function as a
defendant is totally disregarded, and psychiatric opinion only determines the accused's competency to stand trial. Why should the factual ability to function as an attorney, as determined by other attorneys,
be weighed so heavily while the factual ability to function as a defendant, as determined by attorneys, is not even considered?
One could attempt to answer this question by relying upon the
specialized nature of the attorney's work as a professional. In other
words, the skills and standards of the attorney are such that only other
attorneys can properly judge them, while competency to stand trial involves only the ordinary day-to-day standards of rationality and judgment which the psychiatrist is best able to evaluate. This argument,
however, is not on point, because the attorneys are judging something
entirely different-namely, his ability to do lawyer's work-while the
psychiatrist would be evaluating his mental capacity to engage in the
work. What the legal profession is saying is that a man may continue
to be able to meet his professional responsibility fully regardless of
what judgment psychiatrists would make as to his mental state. This
is an important point with repercussions throughout this entire area of
study. What it boils down to is this: lawyers will trust and rely upon
psychiatric opinion in judging lay people, but only lawyers will be
competent to judge other lawyers.
It should be neither shocking nor surprising that attorneys have
developed a different standard for judging each other than for judging
non-lawyers. Such special treatment seems to be at the very heart of
having achieved the status of professional. It is not the purpose of this
paper to berate or challenge that specialized treatment, but rather to
point out the confusion and inconsistency in this area in an attempt
to find a better way of dealing with these problems.
Finally, one might question the relevance of this analysis regarding the use of mental illness as a defense to a disciplinary action aris66. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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ing out of the attorney's mental illness. But it is relevant to show several things. First, it demonstrates that lawyers are far from adept at
employing and understanding psychiatric evidence when judging professional misconduct. Second, it reveals that the psychiatric opinion is
used as a rationalization for action which is really motivated from
other sources. Both of these observations have real meaning in relation to the problem under consideration. If the reasons for taking the
action are not truly psychiatric at all, the procedure can be subject
to widespread abuse and could be used arbitrarily to harrass nonconformist elements of the bar. Further, even if the motivation is truly
medical, a lack of ability to understand and give legal weight and
effect to psychiatric evidence could deal great injustice to many attorneys with marginal mental health problems. Therefore, the analysis of how mental illness is treated as a defense reveals valuable information for the profession facing the question of affirmative action
based on the same ground. The most important lesson is that a concerted effort needs to be made in order to develop more logical and
consistent ways of handling this difficult area.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the previous discussion, it seems clear that the
standard of mental or emotional instability set forth in EC 1-6 hardly
represents the "aspirational ideal" it was meant to. On the contrary,
the standard is both medically and administratively unsound, and for
this reason, ought to be modified. At the very least it should not be
applied as stated. The following suggestions are offered as guidelines
for dealing with mental health problems in applicants and attorneys.
A. The Applicant
In order to encourage the use of psychiatry as an aid to mental
health, no applicant should be unqualified for admission to the bar
because he is receiving or has received psychiatric treatment of any
kind. With the possible exception of involuntary commitment and
legal incompetency, which should come out in other ways, no questions
should be asked of the applicant specifically regarding his mental health
history. Assuming that a question is raised, one way or another, about
the individual's mental fitness to practice. law, the concept from the
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Wheelock and Ricketts cases 67 should be adopted and a "probationary
admission" should be gTanted with summary suspension upon a substantial showing of recurrence of the mental problem which interferes
with his ability to practice. This would serve to protect the public and
at the same time give the applicant the only meaningful chance he has
to show that he really is fit to practice. Since fitness to practice is the
most relevant criterion for attorneys, it should be the most relevant
one for applicants as well. Such an approach would permit that criterion to be implemented without exposing the public to an unreasonable risk. Further, in this way, character and fitness committees could
avoid making judgments based on psychiatric opinion which is of
doubtful assistance, since nearly all of the cases involve merely
marginal disorders. The probationary period should not extend too
long; for example, not beyond two years.
B. The Attorney
Suggestions for dealing with the attorney's mental health problems have been made before. In 1962, after the initial Sherman litigation in the state of Washington, the dean of the state law school wrote
a short article in which he suggested rules in this area for adoption by
state bar associations." However laudatory his efforts, his requirements
for lifting the suspension proved troublesome. The dean suggested that
the individual be "completely cured" 6 or that there be "little or no
likelihood of recurrence of the condition." 70 Three years later, in 1965,
the Washington Supreme Court rejected these formulations as ap71
plied to the defense of mental irresponsibility.
The first department of New York's appellate division, which indudes New York City, has passed rules which take a considerably
more sophisticated approach. They provide for indefinite suspension
of an attorney admitted to practice upon proof that he has been
judicially declared incompetent or involuntarily committed to a mental hospital.7 2 The next subsection goes on to state:
Whenever an attorney, a bar association or other agency authorized
to investigate and prosecute disciplinary proceedings under Section
67. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
68.

Stevens, The Lawyer's Mental Health and Discipline, 48 A.B.A.J. 140 (1962).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 141 (Rule A).
Id. (Rule B).
66 Wash. 2d at 720, 404 P.2d at 981.
N.Y. COURT RULES § 603.15(a) (1st Dep't) (McKinney 1972).
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90 of the Judiciary Law, shall petition the Court to determine
whether an attorney is incapacitated from continuing to practice law
by reason of mental infirmity or illness or because of addiction to
drugs or intoxicants, the Court may take or direct such action as it
deems necessary or proper to determine whether the attorney is so
incapacitated, including examination of the attorney by such qualified medical experts as the Court shall designate. If, upon due consideration of the matter, the Court is satisfied and concludes that the
attorney is incapacitated from continuing to practice law, it shall
enter an order suspending him on the ground of such disability for
an indefinite period and until the further order of the Court .... 7
An attorney suspended under these provisions is entitled to reinstatement "upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney's disability has been removed and he is fit to resume the practice of law."7 4
These rules offer an intelligent approach to the mental health
problems of the attorney. Judicially declared incompetence and involuntary commitment are viewed as prima facie evidence of incapacity
to practice, and that is entirely reasonable in light of the standards
used in making such determinations. For example, according to New
York's Mental Hygiene Law mental illness is defined to be "an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by
a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking or judgment
to such an extent that the person afflicted requires care and treatment." 7 From a mental illness of such severity, it is reasonable to
infer incapacity.
Other forms of mental health problems, such as voluntary commitment and psychiatric treatment of various kinds including, assumedly, such things as electroshock therapy, are viewed differently.
They do not necessarily mean incapacity to practice, although they
may. Note that only attorneys, bar associations or other such agencies
may bring the petition, which should be an adequate safeguard against
abuse of the procedure. Expert medical opinion will play an important
part in the determination. Finally, for reinstatement, a suspended attorney must show that his disability to practice has been removed.
Note that it does not say cured, or speak at all in terms of recurrence
of the condition, which makes the approach more reasonable from a
73. Id. at § 603.15(b).
74. Id. at § 603.15(e).
75. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 1.05(17) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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psychiatric perspective. It is also more consistent with the generalized
approach to these problems, discussed above, in which the cases show
that an attorney may be fit to practice despite some continuing degree
of mental illness.
One further word. These rules do not cover the question of the
lawyer's mental illness as a defense to a disciplinary proceeding. But,
to be consistent in formulation, it seems that mental illness should be
recognized as a complete defense. When the illness is established, and
the symptoms can reasonably have caused the misconduct, suspension
is the only appropriate remedy. It affords the same degree of protection to the public and does not carry the punitive sting which is so
out of place under such circumstances. Reinstatement should come by
the same standard discussed above and set forth in subsection (e) of
the first department's rules.7 6
But adopting such rules will solve only part of the problem examined in this paper. The other, the proper use and reliance upon psychiatric knowledge, is more difficult and perplexing. Psychiatry can no
longer be ignored, as it has been, in dealing with the mental health
problems of fellow professionals. By taking time to understand rudimentary diagnostic tools of psychiatry and by relying upon medically
accepted norms and etiology, attorneys can develop processes which
combine legal reasoning and current medical knowledge. In so doing,
lawyers will be affording better protection to both the society they
serve and the profession of which they are a part.
76. N.Y. COURT RULES § 603.15(e) (1st Dep't) (McKinney 1972).

